Certify the Future.
The first platform that co-designs, formally verifies, and generates certified code for safety-critical autonomous systems — from a single set of requirements.
Built for aerospace. Hardened for defense. Ready for the systems that cannot fail.
The broken state of safety-critical engineering.
Verification is where programs bleed — not coding
On a DO-178C DAL-A program, coding is a surprisingly small share of the work. Verification and evidence generation are the single largest cost bucket — commonly 50%, and as high as 60–70%, of total engineering effort (Rapita, AFuzion). DAL-A carries 71 certification objectives to DAL-D's 26, most of them verification. Test-based verification can never be exhaustive; formal verification can — and DO-333 lets you claim certification credit for it.
Requirements defects are cheap to fix — and impossible to find by reading
40–60% of defects originate in the requirements phase, split between ambiguity and outright omission (after James Martin). Yet the cost to fix one escalates by lifecycle phase — from 1× at requirements to 3–8× at design, 21–78× at integration and test, and far more in operations (NASA). Natural-language requirements reviewed by humans leak exactly these defects downstream. Formalizing them into TCTL and model-checking them attacks the failure mode at the 1× phase.
Safety and security are coupled — but designed apart
GPS spoofing, command-link hijacking and sensor injection aren't 'cyber' problems you bolt on afterward — mitigating them changes hardware and software in ways that interact directly with safety and timing. Yet safety and security are still analysed in separate tools by separate teams, and hardware is often frozen before the joint constraints are understood. Root-cause studies place aerospace defects in design and interfaces (NASA) — the empirical case for hardware/software co-design.
of DO-178C engineering effort at high assurance levels is verification and evidence — not coding (Rapita, AFuzion)
of software defects originate in the requirements phase — the cheapest place to fix them, if you can find them (after James Martin)
more expensive to fix a defect at integration & test than at requirements — and far more in operations (NASA)
One pipeline. Requirements to certified code.
Dextra takes your system requirements and produces formally verified, hardware-mapped implementations — with design choices, not just a single answer. Each capability is tagged for what it ships today.
AI-Assisted Formalization
Assisted · engineer-in-the-loopDescribe requirements in plain language; Dextra proposes a formal specification in TCTL / timed automata, flags ambiguity and omission — the defect classes behind 40–60% of downstream defects — and surfaces threat-relevant additions for engineer review. Honest framing: fully automatic natural-language-to-formal translation is not solved by anyone (pure NL→formal accuracy sits near 30%). Dextra ships an assisted, human-in-the-loop formalizer where reliability, not full autonomy, is the design goal.
Design-Space Exploration
Shipped · differentiatorDon't arrive with the architecture frozen. Given the formal behaviour and your constraints — BOM cost, mass, processor family, power, security level — Dextra explores the joint hardware/software design space and returns a Pareto frontier of valid designs, each traceable to requirements and checked against the timed automaton. No incumbent does this: SCADE, Simulink and the MBSE modelers verify or model a design you have already chosen.
Formal Verification
Shipped · standards-anchoredEvery candidate design is checked against your TCTL specification using timed-automata model checking — exhaustive over the modelled state space, not sampled by simulation. And it pays commercially: DO-333 grants certification credit for model checking, so formal proofs can replace portions of the test campaign that dominates program cost. Where Simulink's Design Verifier returns 'Undecided' on timeout, a model checker returns a proof or a concrete counterexample.
Verified Code Generation
Roadmap · via qualified backends todayGenerate hardware-specific, schedulability-aware code (RMA/EDF analysis included) targeting qualified backends — Green Hills, SPARK Ada, SCADE — so Dextra plugs into your existing tool-qualification chain rather than replacing it. Certification artifacts — traceability matrix, verification report, scheduling analysis, safety-case fragments, security assessment — are generated for DO-178C, EASA SORA, ECSS, DEF-STAN and ISO 26262. Today Dextra emits to qualified generators; native qualified code-gen is on the roadmap.
Six stages. One coherent flow.
From raw requirements to a certified, deployable system — without changing tools mid-stream.
Requirements
Engineer imports or writes system requirements — from IBM DOORS, Jama, plain text, or natural language. AI structures them, flags ambiguities, and auto-suggests security threats from the threat library based on system type. Output: a structured, validated requirement set.
Three programs. One platform.
Certified BVLOS Delivery Drone
A sub-25 kg fixed-wing eVTOL delivery drone seeking an EASA Specific-category BVLOS authorization — where the bottleneck is authoring SORA 2.5 containment and OSO assurance evidence, not flying the aircraft.
Read Full Case- ✓ AG(geocage_breach → AF≤T_term flight_termination)
- ✓ AG(gnss_unauthenticated → AF≤T_dr imu_dead_reckon)
- ✓ AG(c2_lost → AF≤T_ll (hold ∧ then RTL ∧ then terminate))
Three forces converging. Right now.
Regulation is hardening into mandates
The EU Cyber Resilience Act is in force (Dec 2024; full obligations 2027), demanding security-by-design across the lifecycle. EASA's SORA gates every BVLOS drone operation. DO-178C's DO-333 supplement grants certification credit for formal methods; DO-326A made aviation cyber-airworthiness mandatory; ECSS was revised in 2025; automotive stacks ISO 26262 with ISO/SAE 21434. Every framework adds security-on-top-of-safety and criticality-scaled evidence — multiplying the certification work manual processes handle poorly.
Defence budgets are in structural expansion
EU-27 defence spending hit a record €343B in 2024 (+19% year-on-year), heading to ~€392B in 2025 (EDA). All NATO allies now meet the 2%-of-GDP floor, with a new 5%-by-2035 target. The European Defence Fund (~€8B, 2021–27) and the €150B SAFE instrument fund exactly the autonomous systems — drones, loitering munitions, autonomous wingmen — that need verified, certified software. The budget is there; the tooling isn't.
AI finally makes formalization tractable
For decades, formal methods needed PhD-level expertise to operate. LLMs now make requirements formalization accessible — not by full automation (still a research frontier), but as a hybrid: LLM-assisted translation with a deterministic formal backend and an engineer in the loop. That is the pragmatic frontier, and exactly the configuration behind the best published aerospace results. Reliability, not novelty, is the barrier Dextra is built to cross.
The systems that cannot fail deserve tools built to match.
Dextra is in early access. We are working with a small number of drone OEMs and aerospace suppliers to validate the pipeline. If you are building safety-critical autonomous systems and want to be first, reach out.